Tariff selection problem

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Tariff selection problem

chris.flath

Hi together,

 

find attached a first draft for the tariff selection method. It strikes a balance between simplicity and economic meaningfulness.

 

Cheers Chris

 

--

Christoph Michael Flath

Information Process Engineering (IPE)

 

Tel: +49-721-9654-828

Fax: +49-721-9654-829

 

==============================================================================

FZI Forschungszentrum Informatik an der Universität Karlsruhe

Haid-und-Neu-Str. 10-14, D-76131 Karlsruhe

Tel.: +49-721-9654-0, Fax: +49-721-9654-959

 

Stiftung des bürgerlichen Rechts

Stiftung Az: 14-0563.1 Regierungspräsidium Karlsruhe

Vorstand: Dipl. Wi.-Ing. Michael Flor, Prof. Dr. rer. nat. Ralf Reussner,

Prof. Dr. rer. nat. Dr. h.c. Wolffried Stucky, Prof. Dr. rer. nat. Rudi Studer   

Vorsitzender des Kuratoriums: Ministerialdirigent Günther Leßnerkraus

==============================================================================

 


Tariff selection.pdf (725K) Download Attachment
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RE: Tariff selection problem

Wolf
Administrator

Hi Chris,

 

For some reason I get an error message when trying to open it.

 

Thanks,

 

Wolf

 

From: chris.flath [via Power TAC Developers] [mailto:[hidden email]]
Sent: Monday, 18 April, 2011 10:51 AM
To: Wolf Ketter
Subject: Tariff selection problem

 

Hi together,

 

find attached a first draft for the tariff selection method. It strikes a balance between simplicity and economic meaningfulness.

 

Cheers Chris

 

--

Christoph Michael Flath

Information Process Engineering (IPE)

 

Tel: +49-721-9654-828

Fax: +49-721-9654-829

 

==============================================================================

FZI Forschungszentrum Informatik an der Universität Karlsruhe

Haid-und-Neu-Str. 10-14, D-76131 Karlsruhe

Tel.: +49-721-9654-0, Fax: +49-721-9654-959

 

Stiftung des bürgerlichen Rechts

Stiftung Az: 14-0563.1 Regierungspräsidium Karlsruhe

Vorstand: Dipl. Wi.-Ing. Michael Flor, Prof. Dr. rer. nat. Ralf Reussner,

Prof. Dr. rer. nat. Dr. h.c. Wolffried Stucky, Prof. Dr. rer. nat. Rudi Studer   

Vorsitzender des Kuratoriums: Ministerialdirigent Günther Leßnerkraus

==============================================================================

 


Tariff selection.pdf (725K) Download Attachment

 


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RE: Tariff selection problem

chris.flath
Apparently Nabble does not properly link the attachment in the emails sent out - works allright in the web interface.

Here is a direct link:
Download
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RE: Tariff selection problem

chris.flath
Just noticed that there was a mathematical error in the document - for the quantal response equilibrium to work utility values need to be positive.
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RE: Tariff selection problem

grampajohn
Administrator
Chris -

This is good, but it's missing a couple of important elements. Choosing a tariff is not like choosing a new bicycle. Everyone already has a tariff, so we need to model the utility of doing nothing, and only switch if the utility of some tariff is higher than the utility of doing nothing. The utility of doing nothing is not the utility of the current tariff, it's higher than that, and it's probably quite variable among a real population. The biggest part of the utility of doing nothing is convenience. This is why we are using a mailbox full of junk mail to represent the tariff market in the spec. For a customer to switch tariffs, there needs to be enough improvement in utility to overcome some sort of intertia. It's probably the same math as the tunneling probability for an elementary particle. It's affected by energy gradient and the height of the barrier.

Another factor is the disutility of variable or time-of-use prices. In order to benefit from such a tariff, either the customer's (net) usage pattern needs to produce a good average price, or the customer must change their habits and shift some loads. Some customers will presumably have or invest in automation for this, and some will have to pay attention and regulate their energy use.

Does this make sense?

Thanks for working on this. You will need to integrate your text and math into the game spec quite soon - we need to put out a draft by the end of April.

John
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RE: Tariff selection problem

grampajohn
Administrator
I almost forgot - you also need to include the signup bonus and early-withdrawal penalty, as well as the possibility of an early-withdrawal penalty for the existing tariff.

Also, this treatment applies to individual customers, but our models are population models. So your model needs to produce not a switch/no-switch choice, but rather the number of customers within the population that will switch.

John
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RE: Tariff selection problem

chris.flath
In reply to this post by grampajohn
grampajohn wrote
Another factor is the disutility of variable or time-of-use prices. In order to benefit from such a tariff, either the customer's (net) usage pattern needs to produce a good average price, or the customer must change their habits and shift some loads. Some customers will presumably have or invest in automation for this, and some will have to pay attention and regulate their energy use.
This is already adressed in the current description. The cost subutility is determined by sampling random consumption stretches and the customer than adjusting its consumption as much as he is willing to to the tariff properties - the hereby realized average cost determines the cost subutility. Clearly, the cost subutility will suffer if the tariff is not suitable for my consumption profile.

The cost subutility is accompanied by the risk subutility which is determined by the variance of the realized cost values under this tariff and furthermore the reliability of a variable tariff, i.e. how variable has it been so far.
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RE: Tariff selection problem

chris.flath
In reply to this post by grampajohn
grampajohn wrote
I almost forgot - you also need to include the signup bonus and early-withdrawal penalty, as well as the possibility of an early-withdrawal penalty for the existing tariff.
Yes - this goes hand in hand with the inertia aspect. But, as noted on Nabble in December, early withdrawal evaluation is really hard. I don't know how to do it properly - this is why I was _always_ against implementing it.
grampajohn wrote
Also, this treatment applies to individual customers, but our models are population models. So your model needs to produce not a switch/no-switch choice, but rather the number of customers within the population that will switch.
I have only limited understanding of the mechanics of population models so far - one natural idea would be mapping the quantal response probabilities to tariff shares.
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RE: Tariff selection problem

chris.flath
In reply to this post by grampajohn
grampajohn wrote
biggest part of the utility of doing nothing is convenience. This is why we are using a mailbox full of junk mail to represent the tariff market in the spec. For a customer to switch tariffs, there needs to be enough improvement in utility to overcome some sort of intertia. It's probably the same math as the tunneling probability for an elementary particle. It's affected by energy gradient and the height of the barrier.
Of course the whole procedure was meant to include the current tariff which would then also be considered in the logit quantal response equilibrium. I like the idea of inertia and added the corresponding subutility and weight to the utility function.
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RE: Tariff selection problem

chris.flath
I added some more implementaiton-oriented material on tariff choice to the game specs.
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RE: Tariff selection problem

Wolf
Administrator

Hi Chris,

 

Thanks for the updates to the spec!

 

Please have a look at the presentation (\papers\talks\TUDelft11ALG) I gave in Delft in Feb this year, since it includes a nice figure (maybe it could potentially replace the current one, or merge the two figures). Starting from slide 23.

 

I also wrote down the generalized utility functions there. Please have a look, and the potential attributes. Maybe we should include the attribute table in the spec?

 

Thoughts?

 

Thanks,

 

Wolf

 

From: chris.flath [via Power TAC Developers] [mailto:[hidden email]]
Sent: Wednesday, 20 April, 2011 15:52 PM
To: Wolf Ketter
Subject: RE: Tariff selection problem

 

I added some more implementaiton-oriented material on tariff choice to the game specs.


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